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n Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke argues that names are
rigid designators. For Kripke, a term "rigidly designates"
an object if it picks out that object wherever it exists, in all
possible worlds. Additionally, to employ David Bostock's
analysis, Kripke argues that identity-statements in which both
terms are rigid designators are necessarily true if they are true at
all" (313). Here Kripke has in mind statements of the sort a is b,"
in which the verb, is, has the character of identity (as opposed to
predication, etc.), e.g. "a square is a parallelogram having four
equal sides and four right angles." Kripke writes that philoso
phers have been interested in identity statements of three sorts:
those employing descriptions, identity statements between
names, and theoretical statements in science. He contends that
identity statements involving descriptions, e.g., "the first Post
master General of the United States is the inventor of bifocals/'
are contingent. Of names and theoretical statements in science,
however, true identity statements of this sort are true necessarily
so.
Initially in this essay, I will provide an account of Kripke's
claim regarding the necessity of identity statements. I will give a
systematic analysis of the structure of Kripke's argument, facili
tating an examination of the mechanics of the argument and my
critique thereof. My criticism lies in the challenge to Kripke's
intuitive claim that proper names are rigid designators, and that
therefore the relation expressed in an identity statement between
a name and the object it picks out is a necessmy one. I will argue
that identity statements (employing descriptions, in names, and
in statements in science) are contingent, not necessary, under
mining Kripke's notion of the a posteriori identity. Ultimately, this
critique challenges Kripke's fundamental notion of rigid designa-

I

1/

/I

Miller is astudent rfphilaophy at Denison Uniwsity, from ruhere he expros
eei/lEa B.A. inMay, 2001.
Episteme • Volume Xl • September 2000

to rt'

Against the Necessity of Identity Statements
tion, the implications of which will be indicated in the conclu
sion.
Kripke on the Necessity of Identity Statements
I begin my analysis with the distinction Kripke notes
between a statement which is necessarily true and a statement
which is contingently so. This distinction will prove useful in the
analysis throughout the paper. He writes:
We ask whether something might have been true,
or might have been false. Well, if something is
false, it's obviously not necessarily true. If it is
true, might it have been otherwise? Is it possible
that, in this respect, the world should have been
different from the way it is? If the answer is no/'
then this fact about the world is a necessary one. If
the answer is yes/' then this fact about the world
is a contingent one. (258)
/I
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The key to Kripke's account seems to be the question of whether
or not something might have turned out. otherwise. For some
thing to be necessarily true, it could not have been different from
the way it is. A necessary truth implies that the world could not
possibly be different in this respect. In contrast, contingent facts
are such that they are not necessarily so. We could imagine the
world in a way such that a contingent fact may have turned out
otherwise.
At this point, Kripke wants to note the distinction be
tween necessary and a priori. Truths about the world which are
necessary could not have been otherwise; this is not to say that
they are discovered a priori on Kripke's account. He writes, /lIt's
certainly a philosophical thesis, and not a matter of obvious
definitional equivalence, either that everything a priori is neces
sary or that everything necessary is a priori" (258). Here he cites a
fundamental difference between the metaphysical nature of nec
essary truths and the epistemological character of a priori knowl
edge. Kripke's assertion regarding true identity statements with
terms that are rigid designators, then, is that the world could not
have possibly turned out otherwise. This is especially important
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for theoretical statements in science, for instance, which on
Kripke's analysis consist of two rigid designators and reveal a
necessary truth about the world, even though scientific facts are
obviously discovered empirically.
This leads to an investigation of the notion of rigid desig
nation, and the terms to which it applies. Kripke defines the rigid
designator as that which picks out the same object in every
possible world; " ... a designator rigidly designates a certain object
if it designates that object wherever that object exists" (259).
Intuitively, he claims that proper names are rigid designators.
This means that 'Sinatra,' for instance, picks out the same person
"wherever that object exists." In any possible way we can think of
the world, then, 'Sinatra' must designate that same person, viz.,
Sinatra. On Kripke's analysis, though Sinatra may not have been
the leader of the Rat Pack, it is not the case that he might not have
been Sinatra (even had he not been called 'Sinatra'). Identity
statements between names, then, become an important focus for
Kripke's analysis. Statements like IICicero is Tully," or "Hesperus
is Phosphorus," express a necessary identity on Kripke's account
as these proper names necessarily pick out the same object in
every possible world. If, for Kripke, these identity statements are
true at all, they are true necessarily so.
The same analysis applies, for Kripke, to identily state
ments regarding scientific theory. That light is a stream of pho
tons; that heat is a form of energy proportional to the molecular
motions of a substance; that water is H 20, all express necessary
identity relations. On Kripke's account, then, (and certainly Put
nam's as well), water is H 20 in all possible worlds. It is important
to keep in mind that both terms in the identity statement are rigid
designators. Thus, in an interesting sense, 'water' designates H 20
in all possible worlds as 'H20' designates H 20 in all possible
worlds. Similarly, regarding names, the rigid designator
'Hesperus' picks out Venus in all possible worlds as does
'Phosphorus.' (As does 'Venus,' for that matter.) Writes Kripke in
the construction of a counterfactual example:
Someone goes by and he calls two different stars
IIHesperus" and "Phosphorus." It may even be
under the same conditions as prevailed when we
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introduced the names "Hesperus"
and
"Phosphorus." But are those circumstances in
which Hesperus is not Phosphorus or would not
have been Phosphorus? It seems to me that they
are not. Now, of course I'm committed to saying
that they're not, by saying that such terms as
"Hesperus" and "Phosphorus," when used as
names, are rigid designators. They refer in every
possible world to the planet Venus. (267)
Kripke therefore argues that in every possible world, even one in
which the terms "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" identify different
objects, 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus/ as we use the terms, still
both refer to Venus. As such, the identity statement, "Hesperus is
Phosphorus" is necessarily true: 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'
designate the object Venus wherever that object exists.
The notion that Kripke defends here is that true identity
statements discovered a posteriori are necessarily true. E.g., state
ments like "light is a stream of photons/' or "Hesperus is Phos
phorus/, which are discovered empirically, are necessarily h'ue
on Kripke's account. This analysis overturns the traditional philo
sophical claim that facts discovered a posteriori are contingent, not
necessary. The question I will examine, then, is: does this account
make sense? Can, we accept Kripke's intuitive claim that true a
posteriori identity statements express necessarily true relations, and
what are the implications of our conclusion?
Structural Analysis of Kripke's Argument
To further the analysis, I will examine the mechanics of
Kripke's theory following the systematic account given by
Micllael Wreen in the article "Proper Names and the Necessity of
Identity Statements." Wreen analyzes the argument of Kripke
into four distinct propositions, illustrated by Kripke's discussion
of the necessary relationship of identity between Hesperus and
Phosphorus. The first point of the argument is that,

a. 'Hesperus' designates Hesperus (Venus).
This, according to Kripke is, of course, true. Additionally,

b. 'Phosphorus' designates Phosphorus (Venus).
These are uncontroversial claims regarding the way in which we
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use the terms 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus/ and these being true,
c. 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' designate the same object (viz.,
Venus).
On Kripke's analysis, then, this being the case,
d. Hesperus is Phosphorus.
It is essential to note, however, that the naming of a term, e.g.,
'''Hesperus' designates Hesperus (Venus)" is contingent. (As
well as that '''Phosphorus' designates Phosphorus (Venus).")
Kripke writes, " .. .in a counterfactual world in which 'Hesperus'
and 'Phosphorus' were not used in the way that we use them, as
names of this planet, but as names of some other objects, one
could have had qualitatively identical evidence and concluded
that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' named two different objects"
(268). This is important to note, as the way the terms 'Hesperus'
and 'Phosphorus' are used may certainly have been otherwise.
We need not go so far at this point even to assume a counterfac
tual situation in which 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' designate
two distinct objects. All I need to indicate here is that it is a
contingent fact that we use the term 'Hesperus' to designate Venus
and the term 'Phosphorus' to designate Venus.
An additional point which is essential to note here is that
according to Kripke's causal theory of reference, causal connec
tions themselves are contingent. On this account, the reference of
a term is determined by a causal chain of users of tha t term, who
intend to refer to the same object as did the persons from whom
they learned the term, ultimately grounded in the object itself.
Kripke writes, "An initial 'baptism' takes place. Here the object
may be named by ostension, or the reference of the name may be
fixed by a description. When the name is 'passed from link to
link,' the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he
learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom
he heard it" (266). Here Kripke implies the contingency of causal
connections, first, as the initial baptism" of a term certainly
could have been different. Additionally, the referent of a term is
entirely dependent upon the contingent meaning derived from a
causal link in a community of speakers. Wreen comments:
II

If [that causal connections are contingent] is true,
and if token-names designate what they do in
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virtue of being causally tied to the objects they
designate, then the facts that 'Hesperus' desig
nates Hesperus, and 'Phosphorus' designates
Phosphorus would have to be contingent them
selves. (322)
It is certainly contingent that reference should be derived

through a causal link among speakers of a term. One cannot
demonstrate a necessary relation between the "initial baptism" of
a term and the term's referring to that same object in a community
of speakers-using the term as understood through causal con
nections. The fact that 'Hesperus' designates Hesperus and
'Phosphorus' designates Phosphorus is demonstrated, then, to be
a contingent one.
The Contingency of Identity Statements
We have shown that the first two propositions of Kripke's
argument are contingent, that 'Hesperus' designates Hesperus
(Venus) and 'Phosphorus' deSignates Phosphorus (Venus). It
follows, then, that the third pOint, '''Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'
both pick out the same object (Venus)" is contingent as well.
Wreen writes, "if it's contingent that a certain causal chain is
grounded in an object, and contingent that a second causal chain
is grounded in an object, it would certainly seem to be contingent
that both causal chains are grounded in the same object" (322).
The argument itself is simple: a is contingent, b is contingent,
therefore, aand b are contingent. If '''Hesperus' designates Hespe
rus (Venus) and 'Phosphorus' designates Phosphorus (Venus)" is
contingent, then, that '''Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' pick out
Venus" is also contingent.
David Bostock takes up this point with a counterfactual
example in which 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' refer to two
different objects. He hypothesizes that two planets/stars may
have had orbits such that the morning and evening appearances
of "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are indistinguishable from
what they are now. Bostock writes, "a situation in which Hespe
rus has one orbit and Phosphorus another is evidently a situation
in which they are different planets" (319). Kripke's analysis
would seem to concede this point. However, Kripke goes on to
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write, " ... still that's not a case in which Hesperus wasn't Phos
phorus. For there couldn't have been such a case, given that
Hesperus is Phosphorus" (267). On Kripke's account, what is key
is the way in which we use the terms 'Hesperus' and
'Phosphorus.' To illustrate this, Kripke contends:
But we, using the names as we do right now, can
say in advance, that if Hesperus and Phosphorus
are one and the same, then in no other possible
world can they be different. We use "Hesperus" as
the name of a certain body and "Phosphorus" as
the name of a certain body. We use them as names
of those bodies in all possible worlds. If, in fact,
they are the same body, then in any other possible
world we have to use them as a name of that
object. And so in any other possible world it will
be true that Hesperus is Phosphorus. (268)
I should mention two significant points here relating to Kripke's
analysis. The first is that Bostock's analysis, not Kripke's, accu
rately reflects the way we use the terms 'Hesperus' and
'Phosphorus.' The hypothetical scenario posits a situation in
which 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' actually do refer to two
distinct objects. The construct of the other possible world itself
thus ensures that the way these terms are used refers to different
objects.
The second point is that Kripke's analysis presupposes
the very conclusion he is trying to prove. Kripke wants to get at
the notion that in all possible worlds, 'Hesperus' and
'Phosphorus' refer to the same object. He does this by asserting
that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' must, in every possible world,
refer to the same object. Bostock's counterfactual example, how
ever, provides a seemingly unconlTOversial account on which the
terms do not both refer to Venus. In this situation, Hesperus is
certainly not Phosphorus. Kripke's assertion seems to be, ironi
cally, counterintuitive. It is important to keep in mind Kripke's
analysis regarding the nature of necessary truths versus contin
gent facts. Contingent facts are such that they could have been
otherwise. The analysis here implies that the relationship of
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identity between Hesperus and Phosphorus could have been
otherwise, thus the identity relation itself is contingent.
Rigid Designation and Other Possible Worlds
The essential tenet to Kripke's notion of rigid designation
is that the rigid designator picks out the same object wherever
that object exists, in all possible worlds. It is interesting to note,
however, that in certain circumstances (detailed by Kripke), a
rigid designator may not actually pick out an object at all. Con
sider Kripke's analysis of the proper name, Nixon. 'Nixon/
Kripke argues, would not only refer to the man Nixon had he not
been called Nixon, but further, would refer to the man Nixon even
if Nixon did not exist. The rigid designator, then,does not
actually pick out one distinct object in every possible world.
Additionally, consider the counterfactual situation detailed
above. In it, 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' refer to two different
objects, though in the actual" world, they refer to only one.
Bostock summarizes the situation as such, the number of entities
referred to when specifying a counterfactual situation need not be
the same as the number of entities ill the situation so specified"
(319). The Nixon example is such that one refers to an object not
in the situation at all. JI":[esperus' and 'Phosphorus' refer twice to
one planet, though in the scenario specified, there nre two. Thus
Bostock concludes, there is no inference from rigidity of desig
nation ... to what can coherently be supposed to happen in coun
terfactual situations" (319). Kripke's argument for necessary
identity is such that' a=b' is a necessary truth if a=b is true and a
and b are rigid designators. It does not necessarily follow, how
ever, that a or b must exist; in another possible world, a may
designate an object while b does not.
Here it is helpful to consider a thought experiment as
introduced by Helen Steward in the article "Identity Statements
and the Necessary A Posteriori." Her thought experiment is such
that a rare particle, similar to a proton (named proton-B), is found
in the nucleus of an atom and has a slightly stronger attraction to
surrounding electrons than does a normal proton. This leads to
variations in melting points and boiling points of various sub
stances and ultimately may lead to entirely different experien
tially physical manifestations of the same atomic structure. She
II
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writes:
What is important is that all plausibility has gone
out of the claim that H 20 and water are the very
same substance, once the properties to which that
particular chemical constitution gives rise are al
lowed to vary in the way described. In the possible
world envisaged, then, water is not identical with
H 20. And so the claim that this identity is a neces
sary truth must be false. (391)
On Steward's analysis, H 20 may pick out an infinite number of
different substances in other possible worlds. With a "normal"
proton it may designate a clear liquid, while with "proton-B" it
may be a purple solid. This indicates a fundamental problem
with Kripke's notion of rigid designation and its relation to the
necessity of identity statements. Steward argues, in fact, that H 20
cannot be a rigid designator as it fails to pick out the same object
in every possible world. On Kripke's own account, then, the
identity statement, "water=H20" could not be a necessary iden
tity as both of the terms are not rigid designators.
This analysis applies to other theoretical statements in
science and proper names as well. 'Hesperus,' even as we use the
term, does not need to designate the same object in all possible
worlds, viz., Phosphorus. 'Hesperus/ as we use the term, picks
out the object we see in the morning sky that is Venus, that in the
"actuaY' world is Phosphorus. Given Bostock's scenario, how
ever, 'Hesperus/ which still picks out the object we see in the
morning sky, fails to designate the experientially indistinguish
able Phosphorus. The underlying notion, then, is that the concept
of rigid designation is problematic. Writes Steward:
An important feature of the term 'H20' is that it
picks out, in every possible world, the substance
that has the chemical constitution H 20 in that
world, so that, unless we have a watertight guar
antee that the H 20 in every possible world is
bound to be the same stuff, there will be possible
worlds in which H 20 is not the familiar, clear,
colorless substance we call water. (394)
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Terms like 'H20' or 'Phosphorus' may, in other logically possible
worlds, pick out objects other than they do in the actual world.
This analysis certainly challenges Kripke's claim regarding neces
sary identities and means that rigid designation becomes trivial:
H 20 refers to H 20.
This is a fundamental critique of Kripke's notion of the
necessity of identity statements as it indicts his intuitive assump
tion regarding the nature of proper names and natural kind
terms. Kripke's principal argument for the necessity of identity
statements is that rigid designation necessitates what can coher
ently be supposed in counterfactual situations. Kripke contends
that 'water' necessarily picks out H 20 in all possible worlds, thus
the identity statement, "water is H20" is necessarily true. The
analysis that rigid designation, however, fails to necessarily de
termine identity in other possible worlds undermines this asser
tion.
Contingency in This World
The analysis in the essay indicates the contingency of the
statement, '''Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' pick out the same object
(Venus)." The argument is initiated in the demonstrated contin
gency of the fundamental identity statements themselves, I:hat
'Hesperus' picks out Hesperus (Venus) and that 'Phosphorus'
picks out Phosphorus (Venus). The conclusion, then, is supported
by the analysis of rigid. designation and other possible worlds.
The notion of rigid designation fails when we construct other
logically possible worlds in which "rigid designators" fail to pick
out the same object. Given this account, Kripke's argument for
the necessity of identity statements collapses.
Here I want to push the argument that the statement
'''Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' both pick out Venus" is contin
gent. Kripke concludes that Hesperus is Phosphorus because the
terms 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' necessarily pick out the sarne
using the names as we do right now, [we]
object. He writes,
can say in advance, that if Hesperus and Phosphorus are one and
the same, then in no other possible world can they be different"
1/ •••
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(268). Having shown, however, that circumstances could have
been otherwise, that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' contingently
pick out the same object, it follows that the identity statement,
"Hesperus is Phosphorus" is ultimately contingent. This argu
ment fundamentally undermines Kripke's project of demonstrat
ing the necessity of identity statements. Kripke's view has impor
tant implications for the philosoPI:ty of language, beyond rigid
designation to theories of reference and broader concerns regard
ing essentialism and epistemology. What the analysis in the essay
demonstrates is that rigid designators fail to necessarily identify
the same object in all possible worlds and that Kripke's conclu
sion regarding the necessity of identity statements from this
analysis is flawed. If we conclude, then, that a posteriori identity
statements are contingent, we move the discourse in the relevant
fields forward, having gained an important insight.
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